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Abstract
Argument Systems provide a rich abstraction within which divers concepts of reasoning,
acceptability and defeasibility of arguments, etc., may be studied using a unified framework. Two
important concepts of the acceptability of an argument p in such systems are credulous acceptance
to capture the notion that p can be ‘believed’; and sceptical acceptance capturing the idea that if
anything is believed, then p must be. One important aspect affecting the computational complexity
of these problems concerns whether the admissibility of an argument is defined with respect to
‘preferred’ or ‘stable’ semantics. One benefit of so-called ‘coherent’ argument systems being that the
preferred extensions coincide with stable extensions. In this note we consider complexity-theoretic
issues regarding deciding if finitely presented argument systems modelled as directed graphs are
coherent. Our main result shows that the related decision problem is (p)2 -complete and is obtained
solely via the graph-theoretic representation of an argument system, thus independent of the specific
logic underpinning the reasoning theory.
 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Since they were introduced by Dung [8], Argument Systems have provided a fruitful
mechanism for studying reasoning in defeasible contexts. They have proved useful both to
theorists who can use them as an abstract framework for the study and comparison of non-
monotonic logics, e.g., [2,5,6], and for those who wish to explore more concrete contexts
where defeasibility is central. In the study of reasoning in law, for example, they have
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been used to examine the resolution of conflicting norms, e.g., [12], especially where this
is studied through the mechanism of a dispute between two parties, e.g., [11]. The basic
definition below is derived from that given in [8].
Definition 1. An argument system is a pair H= 〈X ,A〉, in which X is a set of arguments
andA⊂X ×X is the attack relationship forH. Unless otherwise stated, X is assumed to
be finite, and A comprises a set of ordered pairs of distinct arguments. A pair 〈x, y〉 ∈A is
referred to as ‘x attacks (or is an attacker of ) y’ or ‘y is attacked by x’.
For R, S subsets of arguments in the system H(〈X ,A〉), we say that
(a) s ∈ S is attacked by R if there is some r ∈ R such that 〈r, s〉 ∈A.
(b) x ∈ X is acceptable with respect to S if for every y ∈ X that attacks x there is some
z ∈ S that attacks y .
(c) S is conflict-free if no argument in S is attacked by any other argument in S.
(d) A conflict-free set S is admissible if every argument in S is acceptable with respect
to S.
(e) S is a preferred extension if it is a maximal (with respect to ⊆) admissible set.
(f) S is a stable extension if S is conflict free and every argument y /∈ S is attacked by S.
(g) H is coherent if every preferred extension in H is also a stable extension.
An argument x is credulously accepted if there is some preferred extension containing it;
x is sceptically accepted if it is a member of every preferred extension.
The graph-theoretic representation employed by finite argument systems, naturally
suggests a unifying formalism in which to consider various decision problems. To place
our main results in a more general context we start from the basis of the decision problems
described by Table 1 in which: H(X ,A) is an argument system as in Definition 1; x an
argument in X ; and S a subset of arguments in X .
Polynomial-time decision algorithms for problems (1) and (2) are fairly obvious. The
results regarding problems (3–7) are discussed below. In this article we are primarily
concerned with the result stated in the final line of Table 1: our proof of this yields (8)
as an easy corollary.
Table 1
Decision problems in finite argument systems and their complexity
Problem Decision question Complexity
1 ADM(H, S) Is S admissible? P
2 STAB-EXT(H, S) Is S a stable extension? P
3 PREF-EXT(H, S) Is S a preferred extension? CO-NP-complete
4 HAS-STAB(H) DoesH have any stable extension? NP-complete
5 CA(H, x) Is x in some preferred extension? NP-complete
6 IN-STAB(H, x) Is x in some stable extension? NP-complete
7 ALL-STAB(H, x) Is x in every stable extension? CO-NP-complete
8 SA(H, x) Is x in every preferred extension? (p)2 -complete
9 COHERENT(H) IsH coherent? (p)2 -complete
P.E. Dunne, T.J.M. Bench-Capon / Artificial Intelligence 141 (2002) 187–203 189
Before proceeding with this, it is useful to discuss important related work of Dimopou-
los and Torres [7], in which various semantic properties of the Logic Programming para-
digm are interpreted with respect to a (directed) graph translation of reduced negative logic
programs: graph vertices are associated with rules and the concept of ‘attack’ modelled by
the presence of edges 〈r, s〉 whenever there is a non-empty intersection between the set
of literals defining the head of r and the negated set of literals in the body of s, i.e., if
z ∈ body(s) then ¬z is in this negated set. Although Dimopoulos and Torres [7] do not em-
ploy the terminology—in terms of credulous acceptance, admissible sets, etc.—from [8]
used in the present article it is clear that similar forms are being considered: the structures
referred to as ‘semi-kernel’, ‘maximal semi-kernel’ and ‘kernel’ in [7] corresponding to
‘admissible set’, ‘preferred extension’ and ‘stable extension’ respectively. The complexity
results for problems (3–6) if not immediate from [7, Theorem 5.1, Lemma 5.2, Proposi-
tion 5.3] are certainly implied by these. In this context, it is worth drawing attention to
some significant points regarding [7, Theorem 5.1] which, translated into the terminology
of the present article states:
The problem of deciding whether an argument system H(X ,A) has a non-empty
preferred extension is NP-complete.
First, this implies the complexity classification for PREF-EXT stated, even when the subset
S forming part of an instance is the empty set.
A second point, also relevant to our proof of (9) concerns the transformation used:
[7] present a translation of propositional formulae Φ in 3-CNF (this easily generalises for
arbitrary CNF formulae) into a finite argument system HΦ . It is not difficult, however,
given H(X ,A) to define CNF-formulae ΦH whose satisfiability properties are dependent
on the presence of particular structures withinH, e.g., stable extensions, admissible subsets
containing specific arguments, etc. We thus have a mechanism for transforming a givenH
into an ‘equivalent’ system F the point being thatF may provide a ‘better’ basis for graph-
theoretic analyses of structures withinH.
Our final observation, concerns problem (7): although the given complexity classifica-
tion is neither explicitly stated in nor directly implied by the results of [7], that ALL-STAB
is CO-NP-complete can be shown using some minor ‘re-wiring’ of the argument graph GΦ
constructed from an instance Φ of 3-SAT.1
The concept of coherence was formulated by Dung [8, Definition 31(1), p. 332], to
describe those argument systems whose stable and preferred extensions coincide. One
significant benefit of coherence as a property has been established in recent work of
Vreeswijk and Prakken [13] with respect to proof mechanisms for establishing sceptical
acceptance: problem (8) of Table 1. In [13] a sound and complete reasoning method for
credulous acceptance—using a dialogue game approach—is presented. This approach, as
the authors observe, provides a sound and complete mechanism for sceptical acceptance
in precisely those argument systems that are coherent. Thus a major advantage of coherent
1 This involves removing all except the edge 〈Aux,A〉 for edges 〈A,x〉 or 〈x,A〉: then ALL-STAB(GΦ,A)⇔
¬3–SAT(Φ).
190 P.E. Dunne, T.J.M. Bench-Capon / Artificial Intelligence 141 (2002) 187–203
argument systems is that proofs of sceptical acceptance are (potentially) rather more readily
demonstrated in coherent systems via devices such as those of [3,13]. The complexity of
sceptical acceptance is considered (in the context of membership in preferred extensions)
for various non-monotonic logics in [5], where completeness results at the third-level of the
polynomial-time hierarchy are demonstrated. Although Dimopoulos et al. [5] conclude that
these complexity results ‘discredit sceptical reasoning as . . . “unnecessarily” complex’, it
might be argued that within finite systems where coherence is ‘promised’ this view may be
unduly pessimistic. Notwithstanding our main result that testing coherence is, in general,
extremely hard, there is an efficiently testable property that suffices to guarantee coherence.
Some further discussion of this is presented in Section 3.
In the next section we present the main technical contribution of this article, that
COHERENT is (p)2 -complete: the complexity class 
(p)
2 comprising those problems
decidable by CO-NP computations given (unit cost) access to an NP oracle. Alternatively,

(p)
2 can be viewed as the class of languages, L, membership in which is certified by a
(deterministic) polynomial-time testable ternary relation RL ⊆W ×X × Y such that, for
some polynomial bound p(|w|) in the number of bits encoding w,
w ∈L⇔ (∀x ∈X: |x| p(|w|))(∃y ∈ Y : |y| p(|w|)) 〈w,x, y〉 ∈ RL.
Our result in Theorem 2 provides some further indications that decision questions
concerning preferred extensions are (under the usual complexity-theoretic assumptions)
likely to be harder than the analogous questions concerning stable extensions: line (8)
of Table 1 is an easy corollary of our main theorem. Similar conclusions had earlier
been drawn in [5,6], where the complexity of reasoning problems in a variety of non-
monotonic Logics is considered under both preferred and stable semantics. This earlier
work establishes a close link between the complexity of the reasoning problem and that of
the derivability problem for the associated logic. One feature of our proof is that the result
is established purely through a graph-theoretic interpretation of argument, similar in spirit,
to the approach adopted in [7]: thus, the differing complexity levels may be interpreted in
purely graph-theoretic terms, independently of the logic that the graph structure is defined
from.
In Section 3 we discuss some consequences of our main theorem in particular with
respect to its implications for designing dialogue game style mechanisms for Sceptical
Reasoning. Conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2. Complexity of deciding coherence
Theorem 2. COHERENT is (p)2 -complete.
In order to clarify the proof structure we establish it via a series of technical lemmata.
The bulk of these are concerned with establishing (p)2 -hardness, i.e., with reducing a
known (p)2 -complete problem to COHERENT.
We begin with the, comparatively easy, proof that COHERENT(H) is in (p)2 .
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Lemma 3. COHERENT(H) ∈(p)2 .
Proof. Given an instance, H(X ,A) of COHERENT, it suffices to observe that
COHERENT(H)⇔∀S(¬PREF-EXT(H, S)∨ STAB-EXT(H, S)),
i.e., H is coherent if and only if for each subset S of X : either S is not a preferred
extension or S is a stable extension. Since ¬PREF-EXT(H, S) is in NP, i.e., (p)1 and STAB-
EXT(H, S) in P, we have COHERENT in (p)2 as required. ✷
The decision problem we use as the basis for our reduction is QSAT2. An instance
of QSAT2 is a well-formed propositional formula, Φ(X,Y ), defined over disjoint sets of
propositional variables, X = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 and Y = 〈y1, y2, . . . , yt 〉. Without loss of
generality we may assume that: n= t ; Φ is formed using only the Boolean operations∧,∨,
and ¬; and negation is only applied to variables in X ∪ Y . An instance, Φ(X,Y ) of QSAT2
is accepted if and only if ∀αX∃βY Φ(αX,βY ). That is, no matter how the variables in X
are instantiated (αX) there is some instantiation (βY ) of Y such that 〈αX,βY 〉 satisfies Φ .
That QSAT2 is 
(p)
2 -complete was shown in [14].
We start by presenting some technical definitions. The first of these describes a standard
presentation of propositional formulae as directed rooted trees that has been widely used
in applications of Boolean formulae, see, e.g., [9, Chapter 4].
Definition 4. Let Φ(Z) be a well-formed propositional formula (wff) over the variables
Z = 〈z1, z2, . . . , zn〉 using the operations {∧,∨,¬} with negation applied only to variables
of Φ . The tree representation of Φ (denoted TΦ ) is a rooted directed tree with root vertex
denoted ρ(TΦ) and inductively defined by the following rules.
(a) If Φ(Z) = w – a single literal z or ¬z, then TΦ consists of a single vertex ρ(TΦ)
labelled w.
(b) If Φ(Z) = ∧ki=1Ψi(Z), for wff 〈Ψ1,Ψ2, . . . ,Ψk〉, TΦ is formed from the k tree
representations 〈TΨi 〉 by directing edges from each ρ(TΨi ) into a new root vertex
ρ(TΦ) labelled ∧.
(c) If Φ(Z) = ∨ki=1Ψi(Z), for wff 〈Ψ1,Ψ2, . . . ,Ψk〉, TΦ is formed from the k tree
representations 〈TΨi 〉 by directing edges from each ρ(TΨi ) into a new root vertex
ρ(TΦ) labelled ∨.
In what follows we use the term node of TΦ to refer to an arbitrary tree vertex, i.e., a leaf
or internal vertex.
In the tree representation of Φ , each leaf vertex is labelled with some literal w, (several
leaves may be labelled with the same literal), and each internal vertex with an operation
in {∧,∨}. We shall subsequently refer to the internal vertices of TΦ as the gates of the
tree. Without loss of generality we may assume that the successor of any ∧-gate (tree
vertex labelled ∧) is an ∨-gate (tree vertex labelled ∨) and vice versa. The size of Φ(Z)
is the number of gates in its tree representation TΦ . For formulae of size m we denote by
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〈g1, g2, . . . , gm〉 the gates in TΦ with gm always taken as the root ρ(TΦ) of the tree. Finally
for any edge 〈h,g〉 in TΦ we refer to the node h as an input of the gate g.2
Definition 5. For a formula, Φ(Z), an instantiation of its variables is a mapping, π :Z→
{true, false,∗} associating a truth value or unassigned status (∗) with each variable zi . We
use πi to denote π(zi). An instantiation is total if every variable is assigned a value in
{true, false} and partial otherwise. We define a partial ordering over instantiations γ and
δ to Z by writing γ < δ if: for each i with γi = ∗, δi = γi , and there is at least one i , for
which γi = ∗ and δi = ∗.
Given Φ(Z) any instantiation π :Z → {true, false,∗} induces a mapping from the
nodes defining TΦ onto values in {true, false,∗}. Assuming the natural generalisations
of ∧ and ∨ to the domain 〈true, false,∗〉,3 we define for h a node in TΦ , its value ν(h,π)
under the instantiation π of Z as
ν(h,π)=


∗ if h is a leaf node labelled zi or ¬zi and πi = ∗,
πi if h is a leaf node labelled zi and πi = ∗,
¬πi if h is a leaf node labelled ¬zi and πi = ∗,∨k
j=1 ν(hj ,π) if h is an ∨-gate with inputs 〈h1, . . . , hk〉,∧k
j=1 ν(hj ,π) if h is an ∧-gate with inputs 〈h1, . . . , hk〉,
where π is clear from the context, we write ν(h) for ν(h,π).
With this concept of the value induced at a node of TΦ via an instantiation π , we can
define a partition of the literals and gates in TΦ that is used extensively in our later analysis.
The value partition Val(π) of TΦ comprises three sets 〈True(π),False(π),Open(π)〉.
(T1) The subset True(π) consists of literals and gates, h, for which ν(h)= true.
(T2) The subset False(π) consists of literals and gates, h, for which ν(h)= false.
(T3) The subset Open(π) consists of literals and gates, h, for which ν(h)= ∗.
The following properties of this partition can be easily proved:
Fact 6.
(a) Open(π)= ∅⇔ π is total.
(b) If γ < δ, then True(γ )⊂ True(δ) and False(γ )⊂ False(δ).
For example in Fig. 1 under the partial instantiation π = 〈z1 = true, z4 = false〉 with all
other variables unassigned, we have: True(π) = {z1,¬z4, g1}; False(π) = {¬z1, z4, g3};
and Open(π)= {z2,¬z2, z3,¬z3, g2, g4}.
2 We note that since any gate may be assumed to have at most n distinct literals among its inputs, our measure
of formula size as ‘number of gates’ is polynomially equivalent to the more usual measure of size as ‘number of
literal occurrences’, i.e., leaf nodes.
3 I.e.,
∧k
j=1 xj is ∗ unless all xj are true or at least one xj is false;
∨k
j=1 xj is ∗ unless all xj are false or at
least one is true.
P.E. Dunne, T.J.M. Bench-Capon / Artificial Intelligence 141 (2002) 187–203 193
Fig. 1. TΦ(z1, z2, z3, z4) for (z1 ∨ z2 ∨ z3)∧ z4 ∨ (¬z2 ∧¬z4).
At the heart of our proof that QSAT2 is polynomially reducible to COHERENT is a
translation from the tree representation TΦ of a formula Φ(X,Y ) to an argument system
HΦ(XΦ,AΦ). It will be useful to proceed by presenting a preliminary translation that,
although not in the final form that will be used in the reduction, will have a number of
properties that will be important in deriving our result.
Definition 7. Let Φ(Z) be a propositional formula with tree representation TΦ having size
m. The Argument Representation of Φ is the argument system RΦ(XΦ,AΦ) defined as
follows.RΦ contains the following arguments XΦ :
(X1) 2n literal arguments {zi,¬zi : 1 i  n}.
(X2) For each gate gk of TΦ , an argument¬gk (if gk is an ∨-gate) or an argument gk (if gk
is an ∧-gate). If gm, i.e., the root of TΦ , happens to be an ∨-gate, then an additional
argument gm is included. We subsequently denote this set of arguments by GΦ .
The attack relationship—AΦ—over XΦ contains:
(A1) {〈zi ,¬zi〉, 〈¬zi , zi〉: 1 i  n}.
(A2) 〈¬gm,gm〉 if gm is an ∨-gate in TΦ .
(A3) If gk is an ∧-gate with inputs {h1, h2, . . . , hr }: {〈¬hi, gk〉: 1 i  r}.
(A4) If gk is an ∨-gate with inputs {h1, h2, . . . , hr }: {〈hi,¬gk〉: 1 i  r}.
Fig. 2 shows the result of this translation when it is applied to the tree representation of
the formula in Fig. 1.
The arguments defining RΦ fall into one of two sets: 2n arguments corresponding to
the 2n distinct literals over Z; and m (or m + 1) ‘gate’ arguments. The key idea is the
following: any instantiation π of the propositional variables Z of Φ , induces the partition
Val(π) of literals and gates in TΦ . In the argument system RΦ the attack relationship
for gate arguments, reflects the conditions under which the corresponding argument is
admissible (with respect to the subset of literal arguments marked out by π ). For example,
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Fig. 2. The argument system RΦ from the formula of Fig. 1.
suppose g1 is an ∨-gate with literals z1, ¬z2, z3 as its inputs. In the simulating argument
system, g1 is represented by an argument labelled ¬g1 which is attacked by the (arguments
labelled with) literals z1, ¬z2, and z3: the interpretation being that “the assertion ‘g1 is
false’ is attacked by instantiations in which z1 or ¬z2 or z3 are true”. Similarly were g1
an ∧-gate it would appear inRΦ as an argument labelled g1 which was attacked by literals
¬z1, z2, and ¬z3: the interpretation now being that “the assertion ‘g1 is true’ is attacked
by instantiations in which z1 or ¬z2 or z3 are false”. With this viewpoint, any instantiation
π will induce a selection of the literal arguments and a selection of the gate arguments
(i.e., those for which no attacking argument has been included).
Suppose π is an instantiation of Z. The key idea is to map the partition of the tree
representation TΦ as Val(π) onto an analogous partition of the literal and gate arguments
in RΦ . Given π this partition comprises 3 sets, 〈In(π), Out(π), Poss(π)〉 defined by:
(R1) An argument p is in the subset In(π) of XΦ if:
(p is the argument zi , πi = true) or (p is the argument¬zi, πi = false)
or (p =¬g ∈ GΦ and g ∈ Tφ is in False(π))
or (p = g ∈ GΦ and g ∈ Tφ is in True(π)).
(R2) An argument p is in the subset Out(π) of XΦ if:
(p is the argument zi , πi = false) or (p is the argument¬zi, πi = true)
or (p =¬g ∈ GΦ and g ∈ Tφ is in True(π))
or (p = g ∈ GΦ and g ∈ Tφ is in False(π)).
(R3) An argument p is in the subset Poss(π) of XΦ if:
p /∈ In(π) ∪Out(π).
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With the formulation of the argument systemRΦ(XΦ,AΦ) from the formulaΦ(Z) and
the definition of the partition 〈In(π),Out(π),Poss(π)〉 via the value partition Val(π) of TΦ
we are now ready to embark on the sequence of technical lemmata which will culminate
in the proof of Theorem 2.
Our proof strategy is as follows. We proceed by characterising the set of preferred
extensions ofRΦ showing—in Lemma 8 through Lemma 11—that these consist of exactly
the subsets defined by In(γZ) where γZ is a total instantiation of Z. In Lemma 12 we
deduce that these are all stable extensions and thus that RΦ is itself coherent. In the
remaining lemmata, we consider the argument systems arising by transforming instances
Φ(X,Y ) of QSAT2. In these, however, we add to the basic system defined by RΦ (which
will have 4n literal arguments and m (or m + 1) gate arguments) an additional set of
3 control arguments one of which attacks all of the Y -literal arguments: we denote this
augmented system byHΦ(WΦ,BΦ). As will be seen in Lemma 15, it follows easily from
Lemma 10 that for any 〈αX,βY 〉 satisfying Φ(X,Y ) the subset In(αX,βY ) is a stable
extension of both RΦ and HΦ . The crucial property provided by the additional control
arguments in HΦ is proved in Lemma 16: if for αX there is no βY for which 〈αX,βY 〉
satisfies Φ(X,Y ) then the subset In(αX) (defined from RΦ ) is a preferred but not stable
extension of HΦ , where In(αX) denotes the set In(αX,∗,∗, . . . ,∗) in which every yi is
unassigned. The reason for introducing the control arguments in moving from RΦ to HΦ
is that In(αX) is not a preferred extension of RΦ : although it is admissible, it could be
extended by adding, for example, Y -literal arguments. The design of HΦ will be such
that unless the gate argument gm can be used in an admissible extension of In(αX) then
In(αX) is already maximal in HΦ and not a stable extension since the control arguments
are not attacked. Finally, in Lemma 17, it is demonstrated that the only preferred extensions
of HΦ are those arising as a result of Lemmas 15 and 16. Theorem 2 will follow easily
from Lemma 17, since the argument gm—corresponding to the root node ρ(TΦ) of the
instance Φ(X,Y )—must necessarily belong to any stable extension in HΦ : hence HΦ
is coherent if and only if for each instantiation αX there is an instantiation βY such that
〈αX,βY 〉 satisfies Φ(X,Y ), i.e., for which gm ∈ In(αX,βY ) in the system RΦ and thence
in the corresponding stable extension of HΦ .
We employ the following notational conventions: αX , βY , (and γZ) denote total
instantiations of X,Y , (and Z); for an argument p in XΦ , gp (respectively hp) denotes
the corresponding gate (respectively node) in TΦ , hence if gp is an ∨-gate, then p is
the argument labelled ¬gp ; PEM (respectively SEM) denotes the set of all preferred
(respectively stable) extensions in the argument system MΦ , where MΦ is one of RΦ
or HΦ .
Lemma 8. ∀γZ In(γZ) is conflict-free.
Proof. Let γZ be an instantiation of Z and consider the subset In(γZ) of XΦ in RΦ .
Suppose that there are arguments p and q in In(γZ) for which 〈p,q〉 ∈AΦ . It cannot be
the case that hp = ui and hq =¬ui for ui some literal over zi , since exactly one of {zi ,¬zi}
is in True(γZ) hence exactly one of the corresponding literal arguments is in In(γZ). Thus
q must be a gate argument. Suppose gq is an ∨-gate: q ∈ In(γZ) only if gq ∈ False(γZ)
and therefore hp , which (since 〈p,q〉 ∈AΦ ) must be an input of gq is also in False(γZ).
196 P.E. Dunne, T.J.M. Bench-Capon / Artificial Intelligence 141 (2002) 187–203
This leads to a contradiction: if hp is a gate then it is an ∧-gate, so p ∈ In(γZ) only if
hp ∈ True(γZ); if hp is a literal ui , then hp ∈ False(γZ) would mean that ¬ui ∈ True(γZ)
and hence ui /∈ In(γZ). The remaining possibility is that gq is an ∧-gate: q ∈ In(γZ) only
if gq ∈ True(γZ) and thus hp ∈ True(γZ). If hp is a gate it must be an input of gq and an
∨-gate: hp ∈ True(γZ) would force p /∈ In(γZ). Finally if the input hp is a literal ui in TΦ
then in RΦ the literal ¬ui attacks q : ui ∈ True(γZ) implies ¬ui /∈ In(γZ). We deduce that
In(γZ) must be conflict-free. ✷
Lemma 9. ∀γZ In(γZ) is admissible.
Proof. From Lemma 8, In(γZ) is conflict-free, so it suffices to show for all arguments
p /∈ In(γZ) that attack some q ∈ In(γZ) there is an argument r ∈ In(γZ) that attacks p. Let
p, q be such that p /∈ In(γZ), q ∈ In(γZ) and 〈p,q〉 ∈AΦ . If q is a literal argument, ui say,
then p must be the literal argument ¬ui and choosing r = q provides a counter-attacker
to p. Suppose q is a gate argument. One of the inputs to gq must be the node hp . If gq
is an ∨-gate then gq ∈ False(γZ) and hp ∈ False(γZ). If hp is a literal ui then the literal
argument r =¬ui ∈ In(γZ) attacks p; if hp is an ∧-gate then hp ∈ False(γZ) implies there
is some input hr to hp with hr ∈ False(γZ), so that r = ¬hr is in In(γZ) (whether hr is
an ∨-gate or literal) and r attacks p. Similarly, if gq is an ∧-gate then gq ∈ True(γZ) and
hp ∈ True(γZ). If hp is a literal ui then the attacking argument (on q in RΦ ) is the literal
¬ui ∈ Out(γZ), thus r = ui ∈ In(γZ) provides a counter-attack on p. If hp is an ∨-gate
then hp ∈ True(γZ) indicates that some input hr of hp is in True(γZ), so that r = hr is in
In(γZ) and r attacks p. No more cases remain thus In(γZ) is admissible. ✷
Lemma 10. ∀γZ In(γZ) ∈PER.
Proof. From Lemmas 8, 9 and the fact that every argument in XΦ is allocated to either
In(γZ) or Out(γZ) by γZ , cf. Fact 6(a), it suffices to show that for any argument p ∈
Out(γZ) there is some q ∈ In(γZ) such that p and q conflict. Certainly this is the case for
literal arguments, u ∈ Out(γZ) since the complementary literal ¬u is in In(γZ). Suppose
p ∈Out(γZ) is a gate argument. If gp is an∨-gate then p ∈Out(γZ) implies gp ∈ True(γZ)
and hence some input hq of gp must be in True(γZ). The argument q corresponding to
this input node will therefore be in In(γZ). If gp is an ∧-gate then p ∈ Out(γZ) implies
gp ∈ False(γZ) and some input hq of gp must be in False(γZ). The argument ¬hq will be
in In(γZ) and conflicts with p. ✷
Lemma 11. ∀S ∈ PER ∃γZ: S = In(γZ).
Proof. First observe that all S ∈ PER must contain exactly n literal arguments: exactly
one representative from {zi,¬zi} for each i . Let us call such a subset of the literal
arguments a representative set and suppose that U is any representative set with SU any
preferred extension containing U . We will show that there is exactly one possible choice
for SU and that this is SU = In(γ (U)) where γ (U) is the instantiation of Z by: zi = true
if zi ∈ U ; zi = false if ¬zi ∈ U . Consider the following procedure that takes as input a
representative set U and returns a subset SU ∈PER with U ⊆ SU .
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(1) SU :=U ; TU :=XΦ .
(2) TU := TU/SU .
(3) if TU = ∅ then return SU and stop.
(4) TU := TU/{q ∈ TU : 〈p,q〉 ∈AΦ for some p ∈ SU }.
(5) SU := SU ∪ {q ∈ TU : for all p ∈ TU , 〈p,q〉 /∈AΦ}.
(6) goto step (2).
We can note three properties of this procedure. Firstly, it always halts: once the literal
arguments in the representative set U and their complements have been removed from TU
(in steps (2) and (4)), the directed graph-structure remaining is acyclic and thus has at least
one argument that is attacked by no others. Thus each iteration of the main loop removes
at least one argument from TU which eventually becomes empty. Secondly, the set SU
is in PER: the initial set (U ) is admissible and the arguments removed from TU at each
iteration are those that have just been added to SU (step (2)) as well as those attacked by
such arguments (step (4)); in addition the arguments added to SU at each stage are those
that have had counter-attacks to all potential attackers already placed in SU . Finally for any
given U the subset SU returned by this procedure is uniquely defined. In summary, every
S ∈ PER is defined through exactly one representative set, US , and every representative
set U develops to a unique SU ∈ PER. Each representative set, U , however, has the form
In(γ (U))∩ {zi,¬zi : 1 i  n}, and hence the unique preferred extension, SU , consistent
with U is In(γ (U)). ✷
Lemma 12. The argument system RΦ(XΦ,AΦ) is coherent.
Proof. The procedure of Lemma 11 only excludes an argument, q , from the set SU
under construction if q is attacked by some argument p ∈ SU . Thus, SU is always a
stable extension, and since Lemma 11 accounts for all S ∈ PER, we deduce that RΦ
is coherent. ✷
Although our preceding three results characterise RΦ as coherent, this, in itself, does
not allow RΦ be used directly as the transformation for instances Φ(X,Y ) of QSAT2. The
overall aim is to construct an argument system from Φ(X,Y ) which is coherent if and only
if Φ(X,Y ) is a positive instance of QSAT2. The problem with RΦ is that, even though
Φ(X,Y ) may be a positive instance, there could be instantiations, 〈αX,βY 〉 which fail to
satisfy Φ(X,Y ) but give rise to a stable extension In(αX,βY ), e.g., for βY with which
Φ(αX,βY ) = false. In order to deal with this difficulty, we need to augment RΦ (giving
a system HΦ ) in such a way that the admissible set In(αX) is a preferred (but not stable)
extension (inHΦ ) only if no instantiation βY allows 〈αX,βY 〉 to satisfy Φ(X,Y ). Thus, in
our augmented system, we will have exactly two mutually exclusive possibilities for each
total instantiation αX of X: either there is no βY for which Φ(αX,βY ) = true, in which
event the set In(αX) will produce a non-stable preferred extension of HΦ ; or there is an
appropriate βY , in which case In(αX,βY ) (of which In(αX) is a proper subset, cf. Fact 6(b))
will yield a stable extension in HΦ .
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Fig. 3. An Augmented Argument Representation HΦ .
Definition 13. For Φ(X,Y ) an instance of QSAT2, the Augmented Argument Representa-
tion of Φ—denoted HΦ(WΦ,BΦ)—has arguments, WΦ = XΦ ∪ CΦ , where XΦ are the
arguments arising in the Argument Representation of Φ(X,Y )—RΦ—as given in Defi-
nition 7 and CΦ = {C1,C2,C3} are 3 new arguments called the control arguments. The
attack relationship BΦ contains all of the attacks AΦ in the system RΦ together with new
attacks,
{〈C1, yi〉, 〈C1,¬yi〉: 1 i  n
}
,{〈C1,C2〉, 〈C2,C3〉, 〈C3,C1〉
}
,{〈gm,C1〉, 〈gm,C2〉, 〈gm,C3〉
}
.
Using the relabelling of variables in our example formula—Figs. 1, 2—as 〈x1, x2〉 =
〈z1, z2〉, 〈y1, y2〉 = 〈z3, z4〉, the Augmented Argument Representation for the system in
Fig. 2 is shown in Fig. 3.
Lemma 14. If S ∈ PEH then Ci /∈ S for any of {C1,C2,C3}. If S ∈ SEH then gm ∈ S.
Proof. Suppose S ∈ PEH. If gm ∈ S then each of the control arguments is attacked by gm
and so cannot be in S. If gm /∈ S then C3 /∈ S since the only counter-attack to C2 is the
argument C1 which conflicts with C3. By similar reasoning it follows that C2 /∈ S and
C1 /∈ S. For the second part of the lemma, given S ∈ SEH, since {C1,C2,C3} ⊆ S, there
must be some attacker of these in S. The only choice for this attacker is gm. ✷
Lemma 15. ∀〈αX,βY 〉 that satisfy Φ(X,Y ): In(αX,βY ) ∈ SEH.
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Proof. From Lemmas 10 and 12, the subset In(αX,βY ) is in SER. Furthermore, since
gm ∈ True(αX,βY ) it follows that the gate argument gm of RΦ is in In(αX,βY ). For
the augmented system, HΦ , the arguments in In(αX,βY ) remain admissible: attacks
on Y -literal arguments by the control argument C1 are attacked in turn by the gate
argument gm. In addition, using the arguments of Lemma 10 no arguments in Out(αX,βY )
can be added to the set In(αX,βY ) within HΦ without conflict. Thus In(αX,βY ) ∈ SEH
whenever Φ(αX,βY ) holds. ✷
Lemma 16. If αX is such that no instantiation βY of Y , leads to 〈αX,βY 〉 satisfying
Φ(X,Y ) then In(αX) ∈PEH/SEH.
Proof. The subset In(αX) of RΦ can be shown to be admissible (in bothRΦ andHΦ ) by
an argument similar to that of Lemma 9.4 Suppose for all βY , we have Φ(αX,βY )= false,
and consider any subset S of WΦ in HΦ for which In(αX)⊂ S. We show that S /∈ PEH.
Assume the contrary holds. From Lemma 14 no control argument is in S. If gm ∈ S then
S must contain a representative set, VY say, of the Y -literal arguments matching some
instantiation βY . From the argument used to prove Lemma 11, In(αX,βY ) is the only
preferred extension in RΦ consistent with the literal choices indicated by αX and βY ,
and thus would be the only such possibility for HΦ . Now we obtain a contradiction since
gm /∈ In(αX,βY ) (in either system), and so cannot be used in HΦ to counter the attack
by C1 on the representative set VY . Thus we can assume that gm /∈ S. From this it follows
that no Y -literal argument is in S (as gm is the only attacker of the control argument C1
which attacks Y -literals). Now consider the gates in TΦ topologically sorted, i.e., assigned a
number 1 κ(g)m such that all of the inputs for a gate numbered κ(g) are from literals
or gates h with κ(h) < κ(g). Let q be an argument such that gq is the first gate in this
topological ordering for which q ∈ S/In(αX). We must have gq ∈ Open(αX) otherwise—
i.e., q ∈ Out(αX)—q would already be excluded from any admissible set having In(αX)
as a subset. Consider the set of arguments in WΦ that attack q . At least one attacker, p,
must be a node hp in TΦ for which hp ∈ Open(αX). Now our proof is completed: S has
no available counter-attack to the attack by p on q since such could only arise from a
Y -literal argument (all of which have been excluded) or from another gate argument r with
gr ∈ Open(αX), however, κ(gr) < κ(hp) < κ(gq) and r ∈ S contradicts the choice of q .
Fig. 4 illustrates the possibilities. We conclude that the subset In(αX) of WΦ is in PEH
whenever there is no βY with which Φ(αX,βY ) = true, and since the control arguments
are not attacked, In(αX) /∈ SEH. ✷
Lemma 17. If S ∈ SEH then S = In(αX,βY ) (with Φ(αX,βY )= true). If S ∈ PEH/SEH
then S = In(αX) and Φ(αX,βY )= false for all βY .
4 A minor addition is required in that since αX is a partial instantiation (of 〈X,Y 〉) it has to be shown that all
arguments p that attack arguments q ∈ In(αX) belong to the subset Out(αX), i.e., are not in Poss(αX). With the
generalisation of ∧ and ∨ to allow unassigned values, it is not difficult to show that if p ∈ Poss(αX) then any
argument q attacked by p inRΦ cannot belong to In(αX).
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Fig. 4. Final cases in the proof of Lemma 16: q ∈ Poss(αX) is not admissible.
Proof. Consider any S ∈ PEH. It is certainly the case that S has as a subset some
representative set, VX from the X-literal arguments. Suppose we modify the procedure
described in the proof of Lemma 11, to one which takes as input a representative set V of
the X-literals and returns a subset SV of the argumentsWΦ of HΦ in the following way:
(1) SV := V ; newTV :=WΦ ;
(2) oldTV := newTV ; newTV := oldTV /SV ;
(3) if newTV = oldTV then return SV and stop;
(4) newTV := newTV /{q ∈ newTV : 〈p,q〉 ∈ BΦ for some p ∈ SV };
(5) SV := SV ∪ {q ∈ newTV : for all p ∈ newTV , 〈p,q〉 /∈ BΦ};
(6) goto step (2).
The set SV is an admissible subset of WΦ that contains only X-literal arguments and a
(possibly empty) subset G of the gate arguments GΦ . Furthermore, given V , there is a
unique SV returned by this procedure. It follows that for any S ∈ PEH, V ⊆ S⇒ SV ⊆ S
for the representative set V associated with S. This set, V , matches the literal arguments
selected by some instantiation α(V ) of X, and so as in the proof of Lemma 11, we can
deduce that SV = In(α(V )). This suffices to complete the proof: we have established that
every set S in PEH contains a subset In(αX) for some instantiation αX : from Lemma 16,
In(αX) is not maximal if and only if S = In(αX,βY ) for some βY with Φ(αX,βY ) =
true. ✷
The proof of our main theorem is now easy to construct.
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Proof of Theorem 2. It has already been shown that COHERENT∈(p)2 in Lemma 3. To
complete the proof we need only show that Φ(X,Y ) is a positive instance of QSAT2 if and
only if HΦ is coherent.
First suppose that for all instantiations αX there is some instantiation βY for which
Φ(αX,βY ) holds. From Lemmas 15 and 17 it follows that all preferred extensions in HΦ
are of the form In(αX,βY ), and these are all stable extensions, hence HΦ is coherent.
Similarly, suppose that HΦ is coherent. Let αX be any total instantiation of X. Suppose,
by way of contradiction, that for all βY , Φ(αX,βY ) = false. From Lemma 16, In(αX) is
a preferred extension in this case, and hence (since HΦ was assumed to be coherent) a
stable extension. From Lemma 14 this implies that gm ∈ In(αX) which could only happen
if gm ∈ True(αX) for TΦ , i.e., the value of Φ is determined in this case, independently of
the instantiation of Y , contradicting the assumption that Φ(αX,βY ) was false for every
choice of βY . Thus we deduce that Φ(X,Y ) is a positive instance of QSAT2 if and only if
HΦ is coherent so completing the proof that COHERENT is (p)2 -complete. ✷
An easy corollary of the reduction in Theorem 2 is
Corollary 18. SA is (p)2 -complete.
Proof. That SA∈(p)2 follows from the fact that x is sceptically accepted in H(X ,A) if
and only if: for every subset S of X either S is not a preferred extension or x is in S. To
see that SA is (p)2 -hard, we need only observe that in order for HΦ to be coherent, the
gate argument gm must occur in in every preferred extension of HΦ in the reduction of
Theorem 2 Thus,HΦ is coherent if and only if gm is sceptically accepted in HΦ . ✷
3. Consequences of Theorem 2 and open questions
A number of authors have recently considered mechanisms for establishing credulous
acceptance of an argument p in a finitely presented system H(X ,A) through dialogue
games. The protocol for such games assumes two players—the Defender (D) and
Challenger (C)—and prescribe a move (or locution) repertoire together with the criteria
governing the application of moves and concepts of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’. The typical
scenario is that following D asserting p the players take alternate turns presenting counter-
arguments (consistent with the structure of H) to the argument asserted by their opponent
in the previous move. A player loses when no legal move (within the game protocol) is
available. An important example of such a game is the TPI-dispute formalism of [13] which
provides a sound and complete basis for credulous argumentation. An abstract framework
for describing such games was presented in [11], and is used in [3] also to define a game-
theoretic approach to Credulous Acceptance. Coherent systems are important with respect
to the game formalism of [13]: TPI-disputes define a sound and complete proof theory
for both Sceptical and Credulous games on coherent argument systems; the Sceptical
Game is not, however, complete in the case of incoherent systems. The sequence of moves
describing a completed Credulous Game (for both [3,13]) can be interpreted as certificates
202 P.E. Dunne, T.J.M. Bench-Capon / Artificial Intelligence 141 (2002) 187–203
of admissibility or inadmissibility for the argument disputed. It may be noted that this view
makes apparent a computational difficulty arising in attempting to define similar ‘Sceptical
Games’ applicable to incoherent systems: the shortest certificate that CA(H, x) holds, is
the size of the smallest admissible set containing x—it is shown in [10] that there is always
a strategy for D that can achieve this; it is also shown in [10] that TPI-disputes won by C,
i.e., certificates that ¬CA(H, x), can require exponentially many (in |X |) moves.5 If we
consider a sound and complete dialogue game for sceptical reasoning, then the moves of a
dispute won by D constitute a certificate of membership in a (p)2 -complete language: we
would expect such certificates ‘in general’ to have exponential length; similarly, the moves
in a dispute won by C constitute a certificate of membership in a (p)2 -complete language
and again these are ‘likely’ to be exponentially long. Thus a further motivation of coherent
systems is that sceptical acceptance is ‘at worst’ CO-NP-complete: short certificates that an
argument is not sceptically accepted always exist.
The fact that sceptical acceptance is ‘easier’ to decide for coherent argument systems,
raises the question of whether there are efficiently testable properties that can be exploited
in establishing coherence. The following is not difficult to prove:
Fact 19. IfH(X ,A) is not coherent then it contains a (simple) directed cycle of odd length.
Thus an absence of odd cycles (a property which can be efficiently decided) ensures
that the system is coherent. An open issue concerns coherence in random systems. One
consequence of [4] is that random argument systems of n arguments in which each attack
occurs (independently) with probability p, almost surely have a stable extension when p
is a fixed probability in the range 0  p  1. Whether a similar result can be proven for
coherence is open.
As a final point, we observe that the interaction between graph-theoretic models of
argument systems and propositional formulae may well provide a fruitful source of
further techniques. We noted earlier that [7] provides a translation from CNF-formulae,
Φ into an argument system HΦ ; our constructions above define similar translations for
arbitrary propositional formulae. We can equally, however, consider translations in the
reverse direction, e.g., given H(X ,A) it is not difficult to see that the CNF-formula,
ΦH =
∧
〈x,y〉∈A(¬x ∨ ¬y) ∧
∧
x∈X (x ∨
∨
{z: 〈z,x〉∈A} z) is satisfiable if and only H has
a stable extension. Similar encodings can be given for many of the decision problems of
Table 1. Translating such forms back to argument systems, in effect gives an alternative
formulation of the original argument system from which they were generated, and thus
these provide mechanisms whereby any system, H can be translated into another system
Hdec with properties of concern holding ofH if and only if related properties hold inHdec.
Potentially this may permit both established methodologies from classical propositional
logic6 and graph-theory to be imported as techniques in argumentation.
5 Since these are certificates of membership in a CO-NP-complete language, this is unsurprising: [10] relates
dispute lengths for such instances to the length of validity proofs in the CUT-free Gentzen calculus.
6 Translations from non-classical logics into propositional forms have also been considered in a more general
setting in work of Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter [1].
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4. Conclusion
In this article the complexity of deciding whether a finitely presented argument system is
coherent has been considered and shown to be(p)2 -complete, employing techniques based
entirely around the directed graph representation of an argument system. An important
property of coherent systems is that sound and complete methods for establishing credulous
acceptance adapt readily to provide similar methods for deciding sceptical acceptance,
hence sceptical acceptance in coherent systems is CO-NP-complete. In contrast, as an easy
corollary of our main result it can be shown that sceptical acceptance is (p)2 -complete
in general. Finally we have outlined some directions by which the relationship between
argument systems, propositional formulae, and graph-theoretic concepts offers potential
for further research.
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